Conflicts of interest
Opposition criticism of the arms deal is beginning to tell, says Patrick Laurence. The ANC is no longer so confident that the deal is safe from corruption or financially viable.
THERE ARE SIGNS that the government has
begun a retreat from its earlier adamantine insistence that the R43.8
billion arms deal is "fail-safe" against corruption. One of these signs
comes from President Thabo Mbeki himself. Though couched in cautious
language, his statement in late July subtly sounding a withdrawal is
radically different in tone from his January 12 declaration, which
marked the opening of the government offensive against the array of
voices either opposed to the arms deal or concerned about its possible
contamination by corruption.
The government's shift is almost certainly a response to sustained
criticism from opposition parties and sections of civil society and,
more particularly, to media exposures identifying members of the ANC
establishment who, to the discomfort of the organisation, accepted
favours from arms manufacturing companies. Embarrassed by the
disclosures, which named no less a person than the chief of the South
African National Defence Force, Siphiwe Nyanda, as the recipient of two
luxury vehicles at an appreciable discount from the European Aeronautic
Defence and Space Company (EADS), the ANC-led government may simply
feel the need to fall back to a more defensible position.
Another possibility, however, is that in a bid to salvage its
reputation as a government committed to the eradication of corruption,
it may be preparing to sacrifice one or two of the ANC notables who
benefited from the generosity of the arms manufacturing industry. It
can hardly contemplate that manoeuvre while maintaining its "fail-safe"
stance. There is no hard evidence of an imminent public washing of
hands of those who have embarrassed the ANC. But two names keep
emerging when observers speculate on who might be jettisoned as
scapegoats: former defence minister Joe Modise and ANC Chief Whip Tony
Yengeni, whose acquisition of a state of the art 4x4 Mercedes at a
generous discount from DaimlerChrysler, which later became a component
of EADS, has long been a talking point.
In his statement to the media in late July, after he and his ministers
had completed their three-day lekgotla, Mbeki announced that the
cabinet had decided to "examine ways of tightening up regulations
dealing with the probity of officials involved especially in the
negotiation of large contracts". The arms deal - or, as government
refers to it, the strategic defence package - is the largest single
deal signed by the ANC-led government and logically qualifies for
inclusion within the ambit of Mbeki's announcement.
Any doubt about whether Mbeki's statement alluded to the arms deal was
removed by his response to a question from one of the journalists at
the briefing. Asked whether the anti-corruption measures he had
referred to were prompted by the current investigation into the arms
deal, Mbeki replied: "Indeed part of what we are saying arose out of
some of the allegations that are being made around the defence
acquisition. Even if the allegations (are) proved not to be true . . .
the issues that are being raised are relevant and therefore we need to
attend to them." Nothing in Mbeki's statement suggested that the issue
would no longer be relevant if the allegations proved to be true. On
the contrary, they implied that substantiation of the allegations would
give them greater relevancy.
Mbeki had earlier indirectly linked the proposed anti-corruption
regulations to the arms deal. Having stipulated that the regulations
would apply to cabinet ministers as well as government officials
involved in the negotiation of "large contracts", Mbeki told
journalists: "The cabinet was of the view that it might very well not
be correct . . . where a minister who works in a particular portfolio,
leaves and then joins the private sector in an area of that portfolio
and most likely with people who got some tenders in that sector while
he/she was a minister." Several journalists deduced that Mbeki was
referring to Modise, justifiably, as the presidential remarks described
the former defence minister's position with uncanny, and perhaps
deliberate, accuracy.
Modise, who signed a contract with a German consortium for the supply
of three submarines three days before retiring and before the
department of finance had completed its affordability study, is today a
businessman with links to the armaments industry. He is the chairman of
Conlog holdings, a company which has links through its subsidiary,
Logtek, with Futuristic Business Solutions (FBS), which has been - to
quote Noseweek - "awarded the logistics contracts for virtually every
programme in the defence package". FBS, which is led by Modise's former
comrade-in-arms during the struggle against apartheid, Lambert Moloi,
is in turn linked to African Defence Systems, a partial subsidiary of
Thompson CSF, the French armaments company. Thompson is a member of the
consortium that was awarded the contract to provide the SA Navy with
four corvettes.
Modise has emerged as a businessman poised to exploit the
opportunities for enrichment in the Coega project, an ambitious scheme
to develop a deep-water port at Coega, about 20km from Port Elizabeth,
and an industrialised development zone (IDZ) around it. His connection
with the Coega project is twofold. When he signed the submarine deal in
mid-1999, he revived (unrealised) hopes that Coega would attract
international investors. Since then a company in which he figures as
chairman and shareholder, Khuthele Projects, has been awarded a
contract to conduct an integrated transportation study for Coega. Thus,
once again, Modise in his new role emerges as, at the least, a
potential beneficiary of a decision that he took while the political
head of a powerful ministry.
Ray Hartle, communications manager of the Coega Development
Corporation (CDC), has attempted to clear Modise of suspicions of
skulduggery. He accuses those who question the probity of the Modise
connection - most notably Colm Allan, of the Public Service
Accountability Monitor (PSAM) at Rhodes University - of being
disingenuous. He states that Modise acquired shares in, and became
chairman of, Khuthele Projects only after it was awarded the contract.
He gives no dates and seems to rely heavily on broad ex-cathedra
statements about the established procedures of tendering.
But, even assuming that his chronology is accurate, it is possible
that Khuthele Projects was awarded the contract because the CDC knew
that Modise was going to invest in it. The chairman of CDC is Moss
Ngoasheng, immediate past economic adviser to Mbeki and thus a man who
moved in the same upper ANC circles as Modise. Raenette Taljaard,
Democratic Alliance (DA) spokesperson on the arms deal, is not
satisfied with Hartle's explanation. She has written to Auditor General
Shauket Fakie asking him to investigate suspected irregularities
relating to Coega. The questionable practices include reports that the
CDC does not have the legally-required IDZ operator permit, which it
should have applied for as part of "a competitive tendering process".
Taljaard's letter specifically asks Fakie to scrutinise the roles of
Modise and Ngoasheng in the Coega project. Fakie, whose office is one
of the three state agencies involved in the arms deal probe, states in
his reply: "I believe the issue of the Coega Development Corporation
would probably require a special investigation of its own. I am busy
seeking legal opinion as to whether I have the legal mandate to look
into Coega's affairs."
Even if Coega is discounted pending further investigation, the nexus
between Modise in his post-political entrepreneurial identity and the
armaments industry seems irrefutable. Modise's dismissal of those who
expose the links and ask questions about them as the peddlers of "lies
and gossip" comes across as defensive bluster. He fits the description
of an ex-minister who has moved into an area as an entrepreneur where
he was active as a minister. That area is now frequented by people who
benefited from tenders awarded while he was in government. United
Democratic Front leader Bantu Holomisa minces no words as he points an
accusing finger at Modise: "He is benefiting, his company is benefiting
and his associates are benefiting."
If Modise is a potential sacrificial candidate as the ANC-led
government seeks to dissociate itself from the suspected malfeasance of
public office bearers, Yengeni is another. According to a front-page
report in the Sunday Independent, Yengeni is the butt of bitter jokes
about "4x4" leaders in ANC ranks at branch level and among former
Umkhonto we Sizwe foot soldiers. During the debate on the motion of
confidence in the Speaker, Frene Ginwala, in June, Holomisa memorably
described him as one of those who said "Viva!" on Saturday and took a
4x4 on Monday. Yengeni is feeling the heat, judging by the full-page
advertisements he took out in selected newspapers in July setting out
how he acquired a luxury ML 4x4 Mercedes Benz in 1998 at a generous
discount from DaimlerChrysler Aerospace.
Two arguments are central to his attempted self-exoneration: his
contentions that the discount was a routine one, no different from
those offered to the ordinary public by vehicle manufacturers, and that
it was nowhere near the reported 47 per cent of the purchase price as
the vehicle had been damaged. If the vehicle was indeed damaged, it is
not clear why Yengeni did not say so before. His advertisement does not
explain why he waited more than four months before stating his case.
Nor does it explain why, specifically, he did not offer a full
exposition of how he acquired the vehicle when the matter was raised in
Parliament and when he was invited to do so before the parliamentary
ethics committee, instead of opting merely to declare his innocence.
His explanation does not refute the initial report in the Sunday Times
that, at the least, he had free use of the vehicle for seven months
before he started to pay for it. Nor does his explanation convincingly
disprove allegations that he only entered into a finance agreement when
his acquisition of a car normally valued at, according to his own
reckoning, R314,000, became a talking point in parliamentary corridors.
Yengeni's advertisement provoked another round of awkward questions
about whether he paid for the advertisements himself or whether a
benefactor or benefactors paid for them.
More questions lie ahead: if he paid for them, the estimated cost of
R250,000 raises the question of how he could afford to spend more than
half his annual salary of just over R400,000 when, by his own
admission, he was still paying off the 4x4 and, in all probability, the
house he purchased in Cape Town in 1996. If he did not, who gave or
lent him the money and why? After an initial and, some would add,
thunderous silence, during which the ANC denied that it had paid for
the ads, Yengeni opted for an imprecise answer - "friends", he replied,
before relapsing into stonewalling mode. Another question was put to
him: while he had attempted to explain his acquisition of the 4x4, why
did he remain silent about the Mercedes cars also acquired by his wife
and his expatriate Congolese woman friend? In the meantime, the riposte
to his advertisement from Douglas Gibson, DA chief whip, went
unanswered. Responding to Yengeni's claim that the discount he received
was a standard discount available to the public, Gibson asked what
member of the public qualified for a discount from an arms
manufacturer? Gibson also commented on Yengeni's statement that as
chairman of the parliamentary portfolio committee on defence - a post
he held in 1998 - he had not been in a position to influence the arms
deal. If that was so, Yengeni and his committee had "totally abrogated
their oversight function" on behalf of taxpayers, Gibson said.
Dealing with the argument that the procurement of weapons for the arms
deal was so complicated a process that no one individual was able to
determine what should be acquired, at what cost and from whom, Noseweek
makes a pertinent point. "EADS . . . didn't rely on one (individual).
They offered inducements to a whole spectrum of people who were jointly
in a position to influence the outcome." Yengeni apart, beneficiaries
include Nyanda, Armscor chairman Ron Haywood, Llew Swan, co-chairperson
with "Chippy" Shaik of the strategic offers committee, and Vivan
Pillay, who led the team negotiating the industrial offsets with arms
manufacturers tendering for contracts.
The DA's Taljaard attaches particular importance to Pillay's
acceptance of the discount, presumably because he was in better
position to influence decisions than most, if not all, of his
co-recipients of EADS' generosity. But Shaik is arguably just as
important a figure. As chairman of the arms procurement committee he
was strategically situated to nudge the process towards one company
rather than another. His neutrality has already been questioned in
Parliament's standing committee on public accounts (Scopa) and in the
media. Those questions arise from the award of sub-contracts to African
Defence Systems (ADS), of which his brother Shabir Shaik is a director.
Chippy Shaik says that he recused himself when his brother's company
was involved. The Mail & Guardian, however, has published extracts
from minutes of a meeting relating to the combat suite for the
corvettes ordered by the South African navy, an issue in which ADS had
an interest. The minutes show that, far from recusing himself, Shaik
chaired the meeting and participated in the discussions. The decision
went in favour of Detexis, a sister company of ADS, at the expense of
the original preferred bidder, the Cape Town firm CCII. All of which
means that Shaik, like Modise, might be an embarrassment to the
government and its assurance that the procurement process was
"fail-safe" against malfeasance.
For the moment, though, the spotlight is on Yengeni. The ANC national
executive's appointment of a special 22-member committee to oversee
party activities in Parliament indicates that Yengeni may have lost the
confidence of the national leadership. Gibson sees it as a simultaneous
"motion of no-confidence in the government chief whip and a power grab
by the executive".
If it is another move to centralise power at the expense of Yengeni,
there is an element of irony. Yengeni cracked the party whip to bring
ANC members on Scopa back into line. Since then they have put party
political interests ahead of their obligation to taxpayers to act as
independent watchdogs over government expenditure on the arms deal. In
a move which has Stalinist undertones, they have even rewritten the
fourteenth Scopa report. It now supports the ANC's line that the
committee did not agree to a multi-agency investigation into the arms
deal that included the special investigating unit (SIU) then still
headed by Judge Willem Heath.
Ironically, too, the newly appointed head of the SIU, Willie Hofmeyr,
has mooted the need in South Africa for the legal equivalent of the
Hong Kong Ordinance of 1970. The ordinance states government officials,
past and present, who maintain a standard of living which is above that
commensurate with their "official emoluments" shall be guilty of an
offence unless they can provide a satisfactory explanation. That
Hofmeyr should place this option on the table as the multi-agency
investigation into the arms deal comes to a close is unlikely to be
coincidental. He is also the head of the Asset Forfeiture Unit and the
deputy director of the National Directorate for Public Prosecutions. He
may be hinting that some people who were involved in the arms deal owe
the public an explanation and that future government ministers or
officials who live above their means should be obliged to explain how
they acquired their wealth.
Many opposition politicians assume, and some leaders in civil society
fear, that the multi-agency investigation into the arms deal may be
less than thorough or perhaps even part of an official cover-up.
Perhaps their misgivings are not totally warranted. They do not take
account of the integrity of people such as Hofmeyr or the possibility
that the investigation may have acquired a momentum of its own which
the men at the top cannot control, even if they wanted too. The
investigators may have unearthed evidence that they cannot or will not
hide. The ANC's political leaders may be preparing public opinion for a
few shocks when their findings are published and for the sacrifice of a
few scapegoats.
The public hearings on the arms deal, held under the auspices of the
Public Protector Selby Baqwa, were widely interpreted as a public
relations exercise aimed at restoring national confidence in the arms
procurement process. Thus the first witness, Vice Admiral Robert
Simpson of the SA Navy, defended the controversial idea that
counter-trade or offset defence and industrial investments would pay
for the arms deal. Simpson even praised Modise as an "outstanding
visionary" who was responsible for promoting the controversial notion
of offsets.
But the same public hearings were the forum for admissions that
increased rather than decreased scepticism over the arms deal. Roland
White, a former senior official in the department of finance now
working for the World Bank in Washington, admitted that the
calculations on which the cost-escalation formulas were based might
have been insufficiently researched. When it was put to him that "no
research" had been done on the formulas, he replied: "In my personal
opinion, your view is probably a fair one." That contradicted
government assurances that the deal would not impose too severe a
burden on the fiscus, assurances that rested in part on the improbable
assumption that offsets worth R104 billion would accrue to South Africa
from the arms deal and generate 65,000 jobs.
Terry Crawford-Browne, of Economists Allied for Arms Reduction,
highlighted the improbability of the assumption on which offset hopes
rested in his submission to the hearing. It implied, wrote
Crawford-Browne, that the way to generate wealth was to spend vast sums
on sophisticated weaponry. If that was so, the solution to Third World
poverty was for those countries to spend their meagre resources on
arms, a manifestly absurd thesis.
White's admission removed a lynch-pin from the carefully assembled
government propaganda exercise justifying the arms expenditure, even
though he tried to qualify it later. Warnings had been issued before
about the danger of sharply escalating costs. The affordability report
by the department of finance said: "The sums involved are extremely
large; they involve fixed contractual commitments extending over long
periods with high breakage costs . . ." Unhappily for government the
affordability report contained a disturbing scenario of a declining
rand and, consequently, a rising arms bill. It forecast that the
rand-dollar exchange rate would be R9.6 to the dollar in 2002-4 and
that it would reach R22.8 by 2017. On the hoped for counter-trade
investments the report came to a sombre conclusion: they could not be
guaranteed. As early as September 1999 the Auditor General reached a
similar conclusion in his special review: "All bidders with whom
contracts have been finalised had to sign performance guarantees as
regards their NIP (National Industrial Participation) commitments. I am
of the opinion that the guarantees . . . may be inadequate to ensure
delivery of the NIP commitments."
In selling the arms package to the electorate, government spokemen
chose to ignore the warnings contained in the affordability report and,
instead, to stress the supposed advantages of the offset investments.
The Institute for a Democratic South Africa criticised it for this in
its review of the arms deal published in May.
Until recently government was supremely confident of the viability of
the deal. It also believed that it was "fail-safe" against corruption
at the level of primary contracts between its arms procurement
committee and the arms manufacturers. Its confidence verged on
arrogance, which rubbed off onto the ANC in Parliament. Scopa's records
of the time its members spent studying the relevant arms deal documents
show that Andries Nel, one of the new members appointed after the
January 2001 reshuffling of ANC representatives, did not bother to
examine the records at all. Another new ANC representative, Vincent
Smith, who is co-head of the ANC study group on Scopa, spent a mere 25
minutes skim-reading a few pages of the huge pile of
documentation.
There are signs that ANC confidence may be waning. Replying to a
question from Taljaard in Parliament, Mbeki's acknowledged that
government fully recognises the "risks identified in the affordability
report". He also implicitly admitted that the first four to five years
of the contract could be financially negative. The government appears
to have begun preparing defensive lines beyond contingency plans to
phase in the costs to avoid too heavy a burden in any one year and, if
necessary, to cancel the second and third tranches of the contract to
buy fighter aircraft. Where former deputy defence minister Ronnie
Kasrils once asserted that South Africa does not have to choose between
guns and butter because it can afford both, government spokesmen no
longer indulge in that kind of extravagant boasting.
Patrick Laurence
is an assistant editor on the
Financial
Mail.
